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Iprovethe subgame-perfectequivalentofthe basic result forNashequilibriainnormal-
form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a non-
empty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this
purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria
as the set of ﬁxed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-
form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive
class of games.
Keywords: Strategic complementarities, supermodular games, subgame-perfect equilibrium,
dynamic games, Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem.1 Introduction
In this paper I deﬁne extensive-form games of strategic complementarities, and prove the
subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of
strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) is a non-empty,
complete lattice. This has strong implications; not only does it give a general existence proof,
it also allows the use of comparative statics techniques. While this seems to be a promising re-
sult, I also show that, in extensive-form games, the assumption of strategic complementarities
is—surprisingly—very restrictive.
Equilibria are usually analyzed by means of ﬁxed-point methods. This has not been the
case for SPNE. A methodological contribution of this paper is the introduction of a device, the
“extended best-response correspondence.” with the property that the set of SPNE of a game
coincides with the set of ﬁxed points of the extended best-response correspondence. The model
of extensive-form games that I use allows time to be continuous, so the extended best-response
correspondence can also be used to analyze SPNE of continuous-time games.
SPNE exist in ﬁnite games. Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) present an example of a
game without an SPNE that is a two-stage game with a ﬁnite number of players, and where
only one player has an inﬁnite strategy space. Hence, existence of SPNE is not guaranteed after
a minimal departure from ﬁnite games. Proofs of existence of SPNE in non-ﬁnite games are
provided by Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) for games of almost-perfect information where
a public randomization device is present, by Harris (1985a), Harris (1985b) and Hellwig and
Leininger (1987) for games of perfect information; and by Fudenberg and Levine (1983) for
classes of games with strong “continuity at inﬁnity” properties.
In this paper I show that the existence of SPNE follows from strategic complementarities;
concretely, that the set of SPNE of a game whose normal-form is a game of strategic comple-
mentarities, is a non-empty, complete lattice. My results apply to continuous-time games and
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Figure 1: Optional Battle of the Sexes
to games of imperfect information that are not necessarily games of almost-perfect information
(I am not aware of other existence results for continuous-time games). The important problem
with my results is that the assumption of complementarities in extensive-form games is very
strong.
Games of strategic complementarities were ﬁrst studied by Topkis (1979), and introduced
into economics by Vives (1990). Topkis (1998) and Vives (1999) contain a deﬁnition of (nor-
mal form) complementarities, with up-to-date references. There are many examples of eco-
nomic models that are games of strategic complements (see Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Top-
kis (1998), and Vives (1999)). By now it is fair to say that complementarities in normal-form
games is a very useful and common structure. Here I show that, while still very useful, com-
plementarities in dynamic contexts are rare.
To illustrate the problem, consider the game in Figure 1. This is “Optional Battle of the
Sexes.” Here, player One chooses ﬁrst to say Yes or No. If One says No then payoffs are 1
each. If One says Yes then they play a Battle of the Sexes game: they simultaneously choose
an element of
￿ O
￿ B
￿ . If the choice is
￿ O
￿ O
￿ then player One gets 2 while Two gets 1. If they
choose
￿ O
￿ B
￿ or
￿ B
￿ O
￿ then both get a payoff of 0. If the outcome is
￿ B
￿ B
￿ then payoffs are
￿ 1
￿ 2
￿
It is easy to see that Battle of the Sexes (BoS, the simultaneous-move game that follows
after One chooses Yes) is a game of strategic complementarities. Player One’s best response to
2Two playing B is to play B and One’s response to Two playing O is to play O. So, a change by
Two from B to O makes One change in the same direction. This is also true for player Two: a
change by One from B to O makes Two change in the same direction. Imposing an order on the
players’ strategies, we can say that O is “larger” than B. Then the best response of each player
is increasing in the other player’s choice of strategy, this is the crucial property of a game of
strategic complementarities (indeed it is easily seen that BoS satisﬁes the deﬁnition of a game
of strategic complementarities in e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1990)).
Now, consider the extensive-form game Optional BoS and let us impose an order on the set
￿ No
￿ Yes
￿ . Let the action “Yes” at One’s initial decision node be larger than “No”. Then the
strategy No-O (say No at the initial node and plan to play O in Battle of the Sexes) is smaller
than Yes-O and No-B is smaller than Yes-B. But, when One is playing No-B it is optimal for
Two to play O, while if we increase One’s strategy to Yes-B then it is uniquely optimal for Two
to play B. This implies that Two’s strategy is not increasing in One’s strategy choice. We could
try to ﬁx this by saying that B is larger than O, but then the problem would arise when One
increases the strategy from No-O to Yes-O.
It turns out that it is possible to make Optional BoS a game of strategic complementarities.
The solution is to say that the action Yes is smaller than No. This shows that extensive-form
games of strategic complementarities are not trivial. 1 But unfortunately the simple solution
in Optional BoS is not feasible in general. I shall show how a complication of Optional BoS
yields a game that cannot be transformed into a game of strategic complementarities. I shall
argue also that most dynamic games of economic interest cannot be transformed into games of
strategic complementarities.
The situation contrasts with the study of Markov-Perfect equilibria in stochastic games
with complementarities (Curtat (1996), Amir (1989) and Amir (1996a)). Markov strategies
limit dynamic strategic interactions, and thus allows complementarities to have leverage, but
when more general strategies are allowed, this breaks down. I shall illustrate the situation with
3examples in Section 4.
Section 2presents deﬁnitionsand notation. Section 3 introduces the extendedbest-response
correspondence and the main results of the paper. Section 4 shows how complementarities are
a restrictive assumption by discussing some examples.
2 Generalized Extensive-Form Games
2.1 Basic Deﬁnitions and Notation
A detailed discussion of the concepts deﬁned in this subsection is in Topkis (1998). A set X
with a transitive, reﬂexive, antisymmetric binary relation
￿ is a lattice if whenever x
￿ y
￿ X,
both x
￿ y
￿ inf
￿ x
￿ y
￿ and x
￿ y
￿ sup
￿ x
￿ y
￿ exist in X. It is complete if, for every nonempty
subset A of X, infA
￿ supA exist in X. For two subsets A
￿ B of X, say that A is smaller than
B in the strong set order if a
￿ A, b
￿ B implies a
￿ b
￿ A
￿ a
￿ b
￿ B. Let f : X
￿ X be a
correspondence. Say that f is increasing in the strong set order if, whenever x
￿ y, f
￿ x
￿ is
smaller in the strong set order than f
￿ y
￿ .
The order-interval topology on a lattice is obtained by taking the closed intervals
￿x
￿ y
￿
￿
￿
￿ z
￿ X : x
￿ z
￿ y
￿ as a sub-basis for the closed sets. All lattices in the paper will be endowed
with the order-interval topology. All products of partially ordered sets are endowed with the
product order. All products of topological spaces are endowed with the product topology.
If X is a lattice, a function f :X
￿ R is quasisupermodular if for any x
￿ y
￿ X, f
￿ x
￿
￿
￿ f
￿ x
￿
y
￿ implies f
￿ x
￿ y
￿
￿
￿ f
￿ y
￿ and f
￿ x
￿
￿
￿ f
￿ x
￿ y
￿ implies f
￿ x
￿ y
￿
￿
￿ f
￿ y
￿ . Quasisupermodularityis
an ordinalnotionof complementarities, itwas introducedby Milgrom and Shannon(1994). Let
T be a partially ordered set. A function f : X
  T
￿ R satisﬁes the single-crossing condition
in
￿ x
￿ t
￿ if whenever x
! x
" and t
! t
" , f
￿ x
￿ t
￿
$
# f
￿ x
"
%
￿ t
￿ implies that f
￿ x
￿ t
"
&
￿
’
# f
￿ x
"
%
￿ t
"
(
￿ and
f
￿ x
￿ t
￿
*
) f
￿ x
"
%
￿ t
￿ implies that f
￿ x
￿ t
"
(
￿
+
) f
￿ x
"
%
￿ t
"
,
￿ . The restriction of a function f : X
￿ Y to a
subset X
"
.
- X is denoted f
/ X
0 .
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Figure 2: An extensive-form game of strategic complementarities
2.2 Deﬁnition of Generalized Extensive-Form Games
I present a deﬁnition of extensive-form games that has information sets, as opposed to decision
nodes, as primitives. It is really only a slight variation on the usual rules for drawing game
trees, but it results in a considerably more general framework because it allows time to be
continuous and does not impose perfect recall or partitioned information structures. 2 I hope
that the beneﬁts of having results that apply to continuous-time games are important enough
to balance the cost of a slightly unfamiliar framework. Besides its generality, this model of
extensive-form games is more parsimonious than the usual one, therefore the proofs are easier
and sharper than they would be otherwise.
I shall use the following example to illustrate the concepts as they are introduced.
Example 1 Consider the game in Figure 2. First, player One selects an element in
￿ L
￿ R
￿ . If
she selects L then the game “ends” and the payoffs are 2 to player One and 0 to player Two. If
she selects R then Two gets to choose between l and r. If he chooses l then she gets 1 while One
gets 0. If he chooses r then player One gets to choose an element in
￿ L
"
1
￿ R
"
2
￿ . Payoffs are
￿ 0
￿ 0
￿
and
￿ 3
￿ 1
￿ after One chooses L
" and R
" , respectively. Let a1 be the ﬁrst node at which player
One moves, a2 be the second node at which she moves and b be the node at which player Two
moves.
Now I shall describe some helpful notions that will build up to the deﬁnition of a general-
5ized extensive-form game. The exact deﬁnition of a generalized extensive-form game is below
(Deﬁnition 3).
Let N
￿
3
￿ 1
￿
5
4
5
4
5
4 n
￿ be the set of players. Let H be a set; the elements of H will be referred to
as “information sets.” Let
6
￿
7
￿ Ha : a
￿ I
￿ be a collection of subsets of H and
8 Hi : i
￿ N
9
a partition of H. The interpretation will be that player i is endowed with a collection Hi of
information sets and that the elements of H
￿
;
: n
i
< 1Hi are the information sets of the game.
For each a
￿ I, Ha
- H should be interpreted as a “subgame” of H (this interpretation is made
precise below). I shall refer to a subgame Ha both as a and Ha.
In Example 1, N
￿
7
￿ 1
￿ 2
￿ , H
￿
=
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ b
￿ , H1
￿
;
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ and H2
￿
=
￿ b
￿ . There are three
subgames in the example, let I
￿
>
￿ a0
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ , Ha0
￿
?
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ b
￿ , Ha1
￿
>
￿ a2
￿ b
￿ , and Ha2
￿
￿ a2
￿ ;
6
￿
@
￿ Ha0
￿ Ha1
￿ Ha2
￿ .
I make two assumptions about
6 , the collection of “subgames.” First, that H itself belongs
to this class of subgames: Let a0
￿ I satisfy H
￿ Ha0. Second, if
￿ Ha : a
￿ I
"
A
￿
B
-
C
6 is a
subcollection of
6 such that any a
￿ a
"
￿
￿ I
" satisfy either Ha
- Ha
0 or Ha
0
- Ha, then
: a
D I
0 Ha
￿
6 —so I assume that
6 is closed under increasing unions. For every a
￿ I,
8 Hi : i
￿ N
9
induces a partition on Ha: let Hi
a
￿ Ha
E Hi be the set of player i’s information sets in subgame
Ha. Note that
6 i
￿
8 Hi
a : a
￿ I
9 is also closed under increasing unions. It is easy to verify
that the example in Figure 2 satisﬁes these assumptions, as does any well-deﬁned game tree.
The players choose actions at each of their information sets. For each h
￿ H, let A
￿ h
￿ be
the set of actions available to the player that moves at information set h. Each A
￿ h
￿ is en-
dowed with a Hausdorff topology. The set of all possible actions is denoted by
F
;
￿
G
: h
D HA
￿ h
￿ .
Player i’s strategy space in subgame a
￿ I is Si
a
￿
8 s : Hi
a
￿
H
F : s
￿ h
￿
I
￿ A
￿ h
￿ for all h
￿ Hi
a
9
￿
Ph
D Hi
aA
￿ h
￿ . Let Sa
￿ Pi
D NSi
a and S
J i
a
￿ Pj
D N
K
M
L i
N S
j
a; s
J i
a is refers to a generic element of S
J i
a .
Note that if A
￿ h
￿ is a complete lattice for each h, then Si
a, S
J i
a and Sa are complete lattices in
the product order.
Each player is endowed with preferences over strategy proﬁles in subgame a
￿ I. These
6preferences are represented by a collection of payoff functions ui
a : Sa
￿ R.
Consider the game in Example 1: A
￿ a1
￿
+
￿
O
￿ L
￿ R
￿ , A
￿ b
￿
P
￿
Q
￿ l
￿ r
￿ and A
￿ a2
￿
+
￿
Q
￿ L
"
￿ R
"
￿ ,
so that
F
R
￿
S
￿ L
￿ L
"
T
￿ R
￿ R
"
U
￿ l
￿ r
￿ . The strategy space for player 1 for the whole game is S1
a0
￿
￿ LL
"
T
￿ LR
"
%
￿ RL
"
%
￿ RR
"
A
￿ —where LL
" means that 1 plans to play L at her ﬁrst decision node (a1) and
then L
" at her second decision node (a2) and so on. The strategyspace for player 2 for the whole
game is simply S2
a0
￿
>
￿ l
￿ r
￿ . The strategy spaces for the other subgames are S1
a1
￿
>
￿ L
"
%
￿ R
"
A
￿ ,
S2
a1
￿
?
￿ l
￿ r
￿ , S1
a2
￿
;
￿ L
"
￿ R
"
￿ and S2
a2
￿
?
￿ / 0
￿ . The choice of / 0 for player 2 in subgame a2 for-
malizes that only 1 makes a choice in this subgame. The players’ preferences in each subgame
are immediate from Figure 2, u1
a0
￿ LL
"
T
￿ l
￿
P
￿ 2,u2
a0
￿ LL
"
%
￿ l
￿
+
￿ 0, u1
a1
￿ L
"
%
￿ l
￿
*
￿ 0, u2
a1
￿ L
"
%
￿ l
￿
P
￿ 1,
u1
a2
￿ L
"
%
￿ / 0
￿
￿
￿ 0, u2
a2
￿ L
"
%
￿ / 0
￿
￿
￿ 0, etc.
Deﬁnition 2 A collection of payoff functions
8 ua
i : i
￿ N
￿ a
￿ I
9 is consistent if, for every i
￿
N and a
￿ a
"
￿
￿ I, whenever Ha
0
- Ha, s
J i
a
￿ S
J i
a , si
a
￿ ˜ si
a
￿ Si
a and zi
a
0
￿ Si
a
0 , the inequalities
ui
a
￿ ˜ si
a
￿ s
J i
a
￿
V
# ui
a
￿ si
a
￿ s
J i
a
￿ and ui
a
0
￿ si
a
/ Hi
a
0
￿ s
J i
a
/ H
W i
a
0
￿
X
# ui
a
0
￿ zi
a
0
￿ s
J i
a
/ H
W i
a
0
￿ imply that ui
a
￿ ˜ si
a
￿ s
J i
a
￿
V
#
ui
a
￿ si
a
/ Hi
a
K Hi
a
0
￿ zi
a
0
￿ s
J i
a
￿ . The collection of payoff functions satisﬁes continuity if, for all a
￿ I,
i
￿ N, and s
J i
a
￿ S
J i
a , si
a
Y
￿ ui
a
￿ si
a
￿ s
J i
a
￿ is an upper semi-continuous function.
Payoffs are consistent if, given opponents’ strategy s
J i, whenever si
a performs better than
˜ si
a in subgame Ha
Z Ha
0 and zi
a
0 performs better than si
a in subgame Ha
0 , it must be that the
combined strategy that follows si
a in Hi
a
[ Hi
a
0 and follows zi
a
0 in Hi
a
0 , cannot perform worse
than ˜ si
a.
The payoffs in Example 1 are consistent: Fix the strategy s2
a0
￿ l by player 2 in subgame
a0, the “whole” game. Given any strategy s1
a0, player 1’s payoff is independent of choices in
node a2. In particular, choosing R
" , the dominant strategy in subgame a2, does not decrease
the payoff to following s1
a0. Now, consider s2
a0
￿ r. The only case where the requirement
consistency has bite is for the strategy LL
" . In subgame a0, LL
" is preferred by 1 to RL
" . But,
in subgame a2, R
" is better than L
" . Consistency then requires that LR
" be preferred to RL
" in
7subgame a0—which is satisﬁed by the speciﬁed payoffs.
Example 1 illustrates why payoffs in any well-deﬁned game tree are consistent. Given i’s
strategy si
a and opponents’ strategies s
J i
a , if a subgame a
" is not reached then i is indifferent
among her choices in this subgame and she cannot do worse by picking something that is
better in the subgame. On the other hand, if subgame a
" is reached then payoffs will be given
by choices in a
" . Choosing a better strategy in subgame a
" can only improve the payoff to si
a.
The deﬁnition of a generalized extensive-form game is complicated enough to warrant an
enumeration of its components:
Deﬁnition 3 The sextupleG
￿
\
￿ N
￿ H
￿
￿
￿ Ha : a
￿ I
￿
￿
￿
8 Hi : i
￿ N
9
￿
]
￿ A
￿ h
￿ : h
￿ H
￿
^
￿
8 ui
a : i
￿ N
￿ a
￿ I
9
_
9
is a generalized extensive-form game if:
‘ N
￿
a
￿ 1
￿ 2
￿
5
4
b
4
M
4 n
￿ is the set of players;
‘ H is a set of information sets;
‘
8 Hi : i
￿ N
9 is a partition of H;
‘
￿ Ha : a
￿ I
￿ is a collection of subsets of H that is closed under increasing unions and
such that Ha0
￿ H for some a0
￿ I;
‘
￿ A
￿ h
￿ : h
￿ H
￿ is a collection of action sets, each endowed with a Hausdorff topology
and compact;
‘
8 ua
i : i
￿ N
￿ a
￿ I
9 is a collection of consistent payoff functions that satisﬁes continuity.
For any subgame a
￿ I, G induces naturally an extensive-form game Ga: let Ha be the set
of information sets of Ga, let the subgames g
￿ I with Hg
- Ha be the subgames of Ga; and let
action sets and payoffs be deﬁned as in G. I will use “subgame” to denote both the set Ha and
its corresponding extensive-form game Ga.
8A strategy proﬁle sa is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in subgame a
￿ I if,
for every g
￿ I such that Hg
- Ha and every i
￿ N,
si
a
/ Hg
￿ argmax˜ si
g
D Si
gug
￿ ˜ si
g
￿ s
J i
a
/ Hg
￿
c
4
I shall refer to the SPNE in subgame a0, the whole game, as simply SPNE. Note that a strategy
proﬁle is a SPNE if and only if its restriction to any subgame is a SPNE in that subgame.
Deﬁnition 4 A generalized extensive-form game G is an extensive-form game of strategic
complementarities if A
￿ h
￿ is a complete lattice for all h
￿ H and if, for all a
￿ I and i
￿ N,
si
a
Y
￿ ui
a
￿ si
a
￿ s
J i
a
￿ is quasisupermodular on Si
a, and ui
a satisﬁes the single-crossing condition in
￿ si
a
￿ s
J i
a
￿ .
It is slightly cumbersome to show that the game in Figure 1, has strategic complements. I
leave this for section 4.
2.3 Examples of Generalized Extensive-Form Games
2.3.1 Optional BoS
I shall present the current notation for the “Optional Battle of the Sexes” game from the in-
troduction. Let a1 be the initial node, b be the node at which player Two moves and a2
be One’s information set after that Two has moved. Then, H
￿
d
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ b
￿ , H1
￿
e
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ ,
H2
￿
S
￿ b
￿ . There are two subgames, so I
￿
>
￿ a0
￿ a1
￿ , Ha0
￿
S
￿ a1
￿ a2
￿ b
￿ and Ha1
￿
S
￿ b
￿ a2
￿ .
Action spaces are A
￿ a1
￿
P
￿
O
￿ Yes
￿ No
￿ , A
￿ b
￿
+
￿ A
￿ a2
￿
f
￿
Q
￿ O
￿ B
￿ . Strategy spaces are S1
a0
￿
￿ YesO
￿ YesB
￿ NoO
￿ NoB
￿ , S2
a0
￿ S1
a1
￿ S2
a1
￿
@
￿ O
￿ B
￿ .
2.3.2 Battle of the Sexes in Continuous Time
The game is a Battle of the Sexes played in continuous time. As Anderson (1984) and Simon
and Stinchcombe (1989) point out, the map from strategies to outcomes might not be well
9deﬁned in continuous-time games, which implies that we cannot deﬁne the payoffs resulting
from different strategy proﬁles. I will not spell out the details in Simon and Stinchcombe’s
(1989) model of continuous-time extensive-form games, I only present a simple example (that
in fact falls within Simon and Stinchcombe’s framework). My construction of strategies and
payoffs is similar to that in Radzik and Goldman (2001) in a class of continuous-time zero-sum
games.
To avoid problems with the map from strategies to outcomes, I impose that players are
only allowed to switch infrequently from one action to the other. Time is indexed by t
￿
g
￿0
￿ 1
￿ .
Assume that players choose either O or B at time t
￿ 0. Their decisions remain ﬁxed for a
period d
￿
h
￿ 0
￿ 1
￿ ; at time t
￿ d they can choose to switch, represented by action 1, or not to
change their time 0 choice, represented by action 0. At any posterior timet, players are allowed
to choose 1 only if they have chosen 0 in
￿t
i d
￿ t
￿ . That is, switches are irreversible for a length
of time d. The players’ “ﬂow” payoffs are as in BoS in the introduction. If, at time t, they both
choose O then One gets a payoff of 2 while Two gets a payoff of 1; when they both choose B,
then One gets 1 while Two gets 2. If they choose different actions at time t then they both get
a payoff of 0.
For any t
￿
j
￿0
￿ 1
￿ , the events until time t are described by a pair of vectors ht
￿
S
￿ h1
t
￿ h2
t
￿ ,
with hi
t
￿
e
￿ ti
1
￿
5
4
M
4
5
4 ti
k
￿ and where ti
l is the time of the lth switch by player i. By the description
above, we must have ti
l
i ti
l
J 1
￿ d for l
￿ 2
￿
5
4
M
4
b
4 k and ti
k
# t. Player i starts with action O if
ti
1
￿ 0, with action B if ti
1
￿ 0. Any feasible ht is called a time-t history. Let Ht be the set of all
time-t histories.
The set of all information sets is H
￿
=
: t
D
.
k0
l 1
m Ht. Any history ht starts a subgame Hht
￿
￿ ht
￿ H : t
# t
￿ ht
/t
￿ ht
￿ , where ht
/t
￿ ht means that ht and ht coincide on switches before
time t. For any history ht, the actions available to player i are
￿ 0
￿ 1
￿ or, if she has switched
recently (so t
i tk
) d),
￿ 0
￿ . I will show that the collection of information sets is closed
under increasing unions. Let
8 Hht : ht
￿ ˜ H
9 be an increasing collection of subgames and let
10t
￿ inf
8 t : ht
￿ ˜ H
9 . Then, all histories ht coincide on switches up to t, let ht be this common
history. It is immediate that Hht
￿
7
: ht
D ˜ HHht. Similarly, the collection of information sets is
closed under intersections.
Strategies are maps ht
Y
￿ si
￿ ht
￿
￿
￿ Ai
￿ ht
￿ , where Ai
￿ ht
￿ is
￿ 0
￿ if the last switch in ht was later
than t
i d and Ai
￿ ht
￿ is
￿ 0
￿ 1
￿ else. A pair of strategies deﬁne, recursively, a ﬁnite collection
of switches. A ﬁnite collection of switches gives, through the deﬁnition of ﬂow payoffs above,
the payoff associated to the strategy proﬁle. Additivity of payoffs (from ﬂow payoffs) implies
immediately that payoffs are consistent.
3 The Extended Best-Response Correspondence and Strate-
gic Complementarities
3.1 Main Results
In this paper I shall focus on subgame-perfect equilibria. In order to keep track of the best
responses to opponents’ strategies in each subgame, I need to introduce the set
n i
￿
>
o
q
p i
￿ Pa
D ISi
a :
p i
a0
/ Hi
a
￿
G
p i
a
r
4
This is the set of lists
p i
￿ Pa
D ISi
a so that the component
p i
a
￿ Si
a that corresponds to sub-
game Ha coincides with the restriction of
p i
a0
￿ Si
a0—the strategy for the whole game—to sub-
game Ha. Let
n
￿ Pi
D N
n i. For the example in Figure 2, recall that S1
a0
￿
s
￿ LL
"
T
￿ LR
"
%
￿ RL
"
%
￿ RR
"
A
￿ ,
S1
a1
￿
a
￿ L
"
%
￿ R
"
A
￿ , and S1
a2
￿
a
￿ L
"
%
￿ R
"
A
￿ . So,
n 1
￿
8
￿ LL
"
￿ L
"
￿ L
"
￿
c
￿
t
￿ LR
"
￿ R
"
￿ R
"
￿
c
￿
t
￿ RL
"
￿ L
"
￿ L
"
￿
c
￿
t
￿ RR
"
￿ R
"
￿ R
"
￿
9
￿
which is really the same set as S1
a0,
n 1 is an accounting device. In general Si and
n i are
isomorphic: identify
p i
￿
n i with
p i
a0
￿ Si. In the rest of the paper I will frequently identify S
and
n
.
11Deﬁnition 5 Player i’s extended best-response correspondence bi :
n
￿
n i is deﬁned by:
bi
￿
1
p
M
￿
u
￿
;
8
v
p i
￿
n i : ui
a
￿
1
p i
a
￿
w
p
J i
a
￿
x
￿ ui
a
￿ ˆ si
a
￿
w
p
J i
a
￿ for all ˆ si
a
￿ Si
a
￿ for all a
￿ I
9
x
4
The game’s extended best-response correspondence is b :
n
￿
n
, deﬁned as b
￿
1
p
M
￿
￿
￿ Pi
D Nbi
￿ s
￿ .
Player i’s extended best-response correspondence assigns a strategy that is a best response
in each subgame to her opponents’ strategy. A game G’s SPNE can be analyzed by means of
its extended best-response correspondence b. Lemma 6 shows the usefulness of the extended
best-response construction. By the construction of b, and the deﬁnition of SPNE, one can
easily see the validity of the following ﬁrst lemma—so I omit its proof.
Lemma 6 The set of SPNE of a generalized extensive-form game equals the ﬁxed points of its
extended best-response correspondence.
The next lemma, Lemma 7, shows that b is not a vacuous construction. The idea behind
its proof is simple. Given opponents’ strategies s
J i
a0, if si
a0 is a best response for player i in the
whole game Ha0, then si
a0 shouldprescribe a best response for subgames that are reached under
s
J i
a0. Also, i is indifferent between strategies on subgames that are not reached. Modifying si
a0
to play a best response to s
J i
a0 also on non-reached subgames yields, by consistency of payoffs,
a strategy that is still a best response to s
J i
a0 in the original game Ha0. Repeating this operation
“subgame by subgame” we can obtain an element in b
￿
1
p
M
￿ .
The reasoning“subgamebysubgame”suggestsa proofby induction. Eveninsimplegames
(like inﬁnitely repeated bimatrix games) the set of subgames is uncountable, so a proof by clas-
sical induction is not possible. The proper tool turns out—expectedly—to be Zorn’s Lemma.
Lemma 7 For all
p
I
￿
n
, b
￿
1
p
5
￿ is not empty.
Proof: Let
p
￿
￿
n
and ﬁx i
￿ N. For any a
￿ I, let bi
a
￿
1
p
t
J i
￿
q
￿ argmaxsi
D Si
aui
a
￿ si
￿
w
p
y
J i
a
￿ . Tychonoff’s
Theorem implies thatSi
a is compact, sobi
a
￿
1
p
t
J i
￿ isnonemptybecause Si
a iscompact and payoffs
12are uppersemi-continuousintheplayer’sownstrategy. LetW
￿
;
8
z
￿ si
a
￿ Hi
a
￿ : a
￿ I
￿ si
a
￿ bi
a
￿
1
p
t
J i
￿
]
9
be the set of pairs of best responses and subgames. Order W by
￿ , where
￿ si
a
0
￿ Hi
a
0
￿
x
￿
@
￿ si
a
￿ Hi
a
￿
if and only if Hi
a
0
- Hi
a and si
a
/ Hi
a
0
￿ si
a
0 . It is immediate to verify that
￿ is a partial order on
W.
Let ˜ W
- WbeanylinearlyorderedsubsetofW. Say ˜ I
- I issuchthat ˜ W
￿
s
8
_
￿ si
a
￿ Hi
a
￿
I
￿ W : a
￿ ˜ I
9 .
Let ˆ H
￿
Q
: a
D ˜ IHi
a. Since
6 i is closed under increasing unions, ˆ H
￿
{
6 i. Let g
￿ I sat-
isfy, Hi
g
￿ ˆ H. For any h
￿ Hg, there is a
￿ ˜ I such that h
￿ Ha; construct si
g
￿ Si
g by setting
si
g
￿ h
￿
￿
￿ si
a
￿ h
￿ . Since ˜ W is linearly ordered, si
g is well deﬁned.
I shall show that
￿ si
g
￿ Hi
g
￿ is an upper bound on ˜ W in W. Clearly, Hi
a
- Hi
g and si
g
/ Hi
a
￿ si
a for
all a
￿ ˜ I. Let si
g
￿ bi
g
￿
1
p
y
J i
￿ and let
o si
g
￿ a
￿
r a
D ˜ I
be the net in Si
g obtained by si
g
￿ a
￿
￿
/ Hi
a
￿ si
g
/ Hi
a,
si
g
￿ a
￿
￿
/Hi
g
K Hi
a
￿ si
g
/ Hi
g
K Hi
a, and directing ˜ I by set inclusion (of the Ha with a
￿ ˜ I). Note that
si
g
￿ a
￿
_
￿ si
g in the product topology. Fix any ˜ si
g
￿ Si
g. Then si
g
￿ bi
g
￿
1
p
J i
￿ implies that ui
g
￿ ˜ si
g
￿
w
p
J i
g
￿
u
#
ui
g
￿ si
g
￿
w
p
t
J i
g
￿ . Now, si
g
/ Hi
a
￿ si
a
￿ bi
a
￿
1
p
y
J i
￿ implies that ui
a
￿ si
g
/ Hi
a
￿
w
p
y
J i
a
￿
$
# ui
a
￿ si
g
/ Hi
a
￿
w
p
y
J i
a
￿ . By con-
sistency of payoffs, then, for any a
￿ ˜ I, ui
g
￿ ˜ si
g
￿
w
p
t
J i
g
￿
V
# ui
g
￿ si
g
￿ a
￿
|
￿
w
p
t
J i
g
￿ . But then ui
g
￿ ˜ si
g
￿
w
p
y
J i
g
￿
V
#
ui
g
￿ si
g
￿
w
p
t
J i
g
￿ , as si
g
￿ a
￿
￿
￿ si
g and payoffs are upper semi-continuous. This shows that
￿ si
g
￿ Hi
g
￿
I
￿ W,
so
￿ si
g
￿ Hi
g
￿ is an upper bound on ˜ W.
The linearly ordered set ˜ W was arbitrary. By Zorn’s lemma there is a maximal element, say
￿ s
} i
a
￿ H
} i
a
￿ , of W. Suppose H
} i
a
~
￿ Hi
a0. Let si
a0
￿ bi
a0
￿
1
p
y
J i
￿ . Deﬁne si
a0
￿ Si
a0 by si
a0
/ Hi
a0
K H
￿ i
a
￿
si
a0
/ Hi
a0
K H
￿ i
a and si
a0
/ H
￿ i
a
￿ s
} i
a. Now,
￿ s
} i
a
￿ H
} i
a
￿
u
￿ W implies that s
} i
a
￿ bi
a
￿
1
p
t
J i
￿ . Let ˜ si
a0
￿ Si
a0, then
ui
a0
￿ ˜ si
a0
￿
w
p
y
J i
a0
￿
￿
# ui
a0
￿ si
a0
￿
w
p
y
J i
a0
￿ and ui
a
￿ si
a0
/ H
￿ i
a
￿
w
p
y
J i
a
￿
x
# ui
a
￿ s
} i
a0
/ H
￿ i
a
￿
w
p
y
J i
a
￿ . By consistency of payoffs,
ui
a0
￿ ˜ si
a0
￿
w
p
y
J i
a0
￿
$
# ui
a0
￿ si
a0
￿
w
p
y
J i
a0
￿ . Hence, si
a0
￿ bi
a0
￿
1
p
t
J i
￿ , so that
￿ si
a0
￿ Hi
a0
￿
$
￿ W and
￿ s
} i
a
￿ H
} i
a
￿
X
￿
￿ si
a0
￿ Hi
a0
￿ . But
￿ s
} i
a
￿ H
} i
a
￿
~
￿
;
￿ si
a0
￿ Hi
a0
￿ . Contradiction, since
￿ s
} i
a
￿ H
} i
a
￿ is maximal.
Construct
p
5
} i
￿
n i by setting
p
y
} i
a
￿ s
} i
a0
/ Hi
a for all a
￿ I. It is then immediate that
p
|
} i
￿ bi
￿
1
p
M
￿
since, by construction, for all a
￿ I,
p
t
} i
a
￿ s
} i
a
￿ bi
a
￿
T
p
t
J i
￿ .
￿
Extended best-response correspondences translate the problem of ﬁnding SPNE to a ﬁxed-
point problem. By adding the assumption of strategic complementarities, ﬁxed points are ob-
13tained by a version of Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem, and the set of SPNE can be analyzed by
“lattice programming” techniques. I includethisversionof Tarski’sFixed PointTheorem—due
to Zhou (1994)—as Theorem 8. Potentially, though, extended best-response correspondences
are useful in other classes of extensive-form games as well.
Theorem 8 (Zhou (1994)) Let X be a complete lattice, and f : X
￿ X a correspondence such
that f
￿ x
￿ is a non-empty, subcomplete sublattice for all x
￿ X. If f is increasing in the strong
set order, then the set of ﬁxed points of f form a non-empty complete lattice.
Theorem 9 If G is an extensive-form game of strategic complementarities, then its SPNE form
a non-empty, complete lattice.
Proof: I need to show that b is monotone increasing in the strong set order and takes non-
empty, closed values in order to apply Zhou’s (1994) version of Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem.
First I show that b is monotone increasing in the strong set order. Let
p
|
￿
w
￿
￿
￿
n
with
p
X
!
@
￿ .
Let
p
￿
"
z
￿ b
￿
T
p
5
￿ and
￿
|
"
z
￿ b
￿
T
￿
￿
￿ . By Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994), for every a
￿ I,
p
￿
" i
a
￿
￿
￿
t
" i
a
￿ argmaxs
D Si
aui
a
￿ s
￿
w
￿
￿
J i
a
￿ and
p
￿
" i
a
￿
￿
￿
t
" i
a
￿ argmaxs
D Si
aua
i
￿ s
￿
w
p
y
J i
a
￿ . Hence,
p
￿
"
c
￿
￿
￿
t
"
￿
￿ b
￿
T
￿
￿
￿ and
p
￿
"
|
￿
B
￿
|
"
￿
￿ b
￿
1
p
5
￿ , proving that b is increasing in the strong set order.
Thatbtakesclosedvaluesisan immediate consequenceofupper semi-continuityof payoffs
in each subgame. By Lemma 7, b takes non-empty values. Hence, by Zhou’s version of
Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem, the set of ﬁxed points of b is a complete lattice. Lemma 6 implies
that the set of SPNE is a complete lattice.
￿
Theorem 9 implies that there is a smallest and a largest SPNE of any extensive-form game
of strategic complementarities. Note that the subgames of any extensive-form game of strate-
gic complements are also extensive-form games of strategic complements. Therefore, by The-
orem 9, each subgame has a smallest and a largest SPNE strategy proﬁle. It turns out that the
extremal SPNE of any subgame are obtained from the extremal SPNE of the whole game. This
has important consequences: It can be seen that, in multi-stage games, the extremal equilibria
14are Markov-Perfect. At the same time, for the reasons discussed in Section 4, the scope of The-
orem 9 on multi-stage games is very limited—hence I choose not to dwell on the implications
of Theorem 9 on multi-stage games here, see Echenique (2000) for the details.
The collection of subgames
￿ Ha : a
￿ I
￿ is closed under intersections if for any a
￿ a
"
￿
￿ I,
there is x
￿ I such that Hx
￿ Ha
E Ha
0 . Any well-deﬁned game tree has subgames that are
closed under intersections (in fact subgames are either nested or disjoint, so they are trivially
closed under intersections).
Theorem 10 Let G be an extensive-form game of strategic complementarities with subgames
that are closed under intersections; let s be its smallest SPNE and s its largest SPNE. If Ha,
with a
￿ I, is any subgame, then s
/ Ha and s
/ Ha are, respectively, the smallest and largest SPNE
of the extensive-form game corresponding to Ha.
Proof: Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a subgame Ha with a smallest SPNE
strategy proﬁle sa that is not equal to s
/ Ha. Let ˜
n
￿
;
￿ ˆ
p
￿
￿
n
: ˆ
p a
￿ sa
￿ , by repeating the argu-
ments above we obtain that ˜
n
is a complete lattice. Let ˜ b : ˜
n
￿ ˜
n
be deﬁned by ˜ b
￿
1
p
5
￿
￿
￿
o ˆ
p
￿
￿ ˜
n
: ui
g
￿ s
" i
g
￿
￿
p
J i
g
￿
￿
# ui
g
￿ ˆ
p i
g
￿
￿
p
J i
g
￿ for all s
" i
g
￿ Si
g
￿ s
" i
g
/ Ha
￿ si
a
￿ i
￿ N
￿ and g
￿ I
￿ Hg
￿ Ha
r
4
That ˜ bismonotone increasinginthe strongsetorder andclosed-valuedfollowsfromarguments
similar to those proving that b is monotone increasing and closed-valued. That ˜ b has non-
empty values can be proved by following the steps in the proof of Lemma 7, and restricting the
optimizing strategies to equal si
a on information sets that also belong to Ha.
By Zhou’s version of Tarski’s Theorem, there is a ﬁxed point
p
￿
￿ ˜
n
of ˜ b. I claim that this
is a SPNE of the whole game Ha0. Fix i
￿ N. For any g
￿ I with Hg
- Ha,
p a0
/ Hg
￿ sa
/ Hg. But
p i
a0
/ Hg
￿ bi
g
￿
T
p
5
￿ since Hg is a subgame of Ha and sa is a SPNE in Ha. Let g
￿ I with Hg
￿ Ha.
G has subgames that are closed under intersections, hence there is x
￿ I with Hx
￿ Hg
E Ha.
Since Hx is a subgame of Ha,
p x
￿ sa
/ Hx so
p x
￿ bi
x
￿
1
p
M
￿ because sa is a SPNE in subgame Ha.
15Then,
p i
g
￿ bi
g
￿
1
p
M
￿ because if there is ˆ si
g
￿ Si
g with ui
g
￿
1
p i
g
￿
￿
p
t
J i
g
￿
I
) ui
g
￿ ˆ si
g
￿
￿
p
t
J i
g
￿ it must be that ˆ si
g and
p i
g
differ on the subgame Hx
￿ Hg
E Ha. But, using consistency of payoffs,
ui
g
￿
T
p i
g
￿
w
p
J i
g
￿
x
) ui
g
￿ ˆ si
g
￿
w
p
J i
g
￿
I
# ui
g
￿ ˆ si
g
/ Hg
K Ha
￿
w
p i
x
￿
w
p
J i
g
￿
c
￿
impossible since
p
￿
￿ ˜ b
￿
1
p
5
￿ . Hence,
p i
g
￿ bi
g
￿
1
p
M
￿ for any g
￿ I so
p is a SPNE.
By Theorem 9 there is a SPNE ˜ s
￿ s
￿
B
p a0 because the set of SPNE is a lattice. Since s and
p a0 differ on Ha, ˜ s is smaller than s, a contradiction.
￿
ComparativestaticsresultsfortheextremalSPNEfollowfromwell-knownresultsinMono-
tone Comparative Statics. For comparative statics of non-extremal equilibria, see Echenique
(2002).
Deﬁnition 11 Let T be a partially ordered set. The collection
￿ G
￿ t
￿ : t
￿ T
￿ is an increasing
family of extensive-form games if, for any t
￿ T, G
￿ t
￿
x
￿
?
￿ N
￿ H
￿
￿
￿ Ha : a
￿ I
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ Hi : i
￿ N
￿
u
￿
￿ At
￿ h
￿ : h
￿ H
￿
u
￿
P
8 ui
at : i
￿ N
￿ a
￿ I
9
￿
9 is an extensive-form game of strategic complementari-
ties; if for all h
￿ H, At
￿ h
￿ is increasing in the strong set order in t and if, for all i
￿ N a
￿ I,
ui
a t satisﬁes the single-crossing condition in
￿ si
a
￿ t
￿ .
Theorem 12 Let
￿ G
￿ t
￿ : t
￿ T
￿ be an increasing family of extensive-form games. Let t
￿ t
"
￿
￿ T
with t
￿ t
" . The smallest (largest) SPNE of G
￿ t
￿ is smaller, as an element of S, than the smallest
(largest) SPNE of G
￿ t
"
￿ .
Proof: Let bt and bt
0 be the extended best-response correspondences of G
￿ t
￿ and G
￿ t
"
,
￿ , respec-
tively. An argument similar to the proof that the extended best-response function is monotone
increasing in the proof of Theorem 9 establishes that, for any
p
x
￿
n
, bt
￿
1
p
M
￿ is smaller than bt
0
￿
1
p
M
￿
in the strong set order. The result then follows from Theorem 2.5.2 in Topkis (1998).
￿
164 Complementarities are restrictive
How common is the existence of complementarities in extensive-form games? There are two
answers to this question. First, one can argue that the order on strategies is not part of the
descriptionof a game, so one has a “degree of freedom” in checking for complementarities, one
can try to ﬁnd an order on strategiessuch that a game has complementarities: So, howoften can
one ﬁnd an order on strategies such that a game has complementarities? Very often—I shall not
expand on why here, but it is a direct application of the characterization in Echenique (2001);
Echenique’s (2001) results require, though, that one knows ﬁrst the number of equilibria of the
game, so it does not provide sufﬁcient conditions for existence, or for comparative statics.
Second, given games with some kind of “natural” order for which heuristically one should
getcomplementarities—forexamplea dynamic variantofastaticgamewithcomplementarities—
the answer is negative. In the discussion belowI shallgiveexamples of games withand without
extensive-form complementarities, I believe these examples explain where the problems arise.
The situation contrasts with the study of Markov-Perfect equilibria in stochastic games
with complementarities. For example, Curtat (1996) (implicitly also Amir (1989) and Amir
(1996a)) imposes supermodularity conditions on payoffs, and is able to obtain results on the
setof Markov-Perfect equilibriausinglattice-theoretictools. Thereason is thatMarkov-Perfect
equilibrialimitthestrategicinteractionover timeenoughsothattheeffectofcomplementarities
is preserved in dynamic contexts—this will, I hope, be clear from the examples below.
1. Optional BoS in the introduction is a game of strategic complementarities. Optional
BoS II in Figure 3 cannot be made into a game of strategic complementarities. Say that Yes is
larger than No and repeat the argument from the introduction: An increase in One’s strategy
from No-OO to Yes-OO makes Two shift from B to O in the game following Yes. Strategic
complementarities requires then that the action O is larger than B at this information set. But
this gives a decreasing response when we shift from No-OB to Yes-OB. The solution in the
17￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
No Yes
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
2
O B
￿
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Figure 3: Optional BoS II
introduction was to change the order on
￿ Yes
￿ No
￿ . But here this clearly gives rise to the same
situation in the subgame following No. 3
The problem is that, off the path speciﬁed by a strategy proﬁle, players are indifferent be-
tween actions. This indifference makes the single-crossing property kick in. If the information
set h is off the path of a strategy proﬁle
￿ si
￿ s
J i
￿ then player i is indifferent between strategies
that differ on A
￿ h
￿ . Now, if s
"
&
J i is a larger strategy, and h is on the path of
￿ si
￿ s
"
&
J i
￿ , then it must
be that payoffs are such that, if a
￿ a
"
￿
￿ A
￿ h
￿ and a is smaller than a
" , then a is preferred to a
" .
That is, preferences have to coincide with the order on actions for every strategy proﬁle that
has h “on its path.”
2. I shall show that, even in simple dynamic games, while “per-period payoffs” are super-
modular, (extended) best responses are not monotone increasing, there is no largest SPNE, and
the set of SPNE is not a lattice. The root of the problem is that the strategic interactions in
dynamic games destroy the effect of complementarities in per-period payoffs.
First I present a ﬁnite-horizon example. Then I present an inﬁnite-horizon example to show
that there are additional problems with dynamic complementarities in inﬁnite-horizon games
(I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pointing out that there are additional problems in
inﬁnite-horizon games). The point of these examples is that there is no hope of generalizing—
with a different notion of extensive-form complementarities—the results in Section 3 to many
games of economic interest.
18a) The example in item 1 is a dynamic game that intuitively should satisfy deﬁnition 4, but
fails to do so. Theorems 9, 10 and 12 depend on the property that best responses are monotone
increasing, and not directly on the supermodularity/single-crossing assumptions on payoffs in
Deﬁnition 4—these assumptions are merely sufﬁcient for monotone (extended) best responses,
not necessary. I shall show that, even in simple dynamic games, while “per-period payoffs”
are supermodular, (extended) best responses are not monotone increasing, there is no largest
SPNE, and the set of SPNE is not a lattice.
Consider the matrix game in Figure 4. It is easy to check that this game has strategic com-
plementarities when each player’s strategy set is ordered by a
) b
) g. Indeed, as each player’s
strategysetistotallyordered, payoffsarequasisupermodular intheplayer’sownstrategies. The
single-crossing property holdstoo, note thatfor player “Row” the single-crossing property only
kicks in when “Column” plays b and Row compares the payoff of b with that of the smaller
strategy a—the payoff to Row of b is higher, and it remains higher when Column increases
her strategy from b to g, so Row’s payoffs satisfy the single-crossing property. Similarly with
Column’s payoffs.
Now suppose that Row and Column play the twice-repeated version of the matrix game.
Suppose that they discount per-period payoffs with a discount factor d
￿ 1
￿ 2. I shall show
that best responses in the twice-repeated version of the game are not monotone increasing, that
there is no largest SPNE, and that there are non-monotone SPNE outcomes.
Consider the following strategy for Column: “play g in period 1, play a in period 2 if the
a b g
a 3
￿ 3 0
￿ 1 0
￿ 0
b 1
￿ 0 1
￿ 1 3
￿ 0
g 0
￿ 0 0
￿ 3 2
￿ 2
Figure 4: A game with complementarities.
19outcome in period 1 was
￿ g
￿ g
￿ , play b in period 2 if not.” A best-response to this strategy by
Row is to do the same, i.e. “play g in period 1, play a in period 2 if the outcome in period 1 was
￿ g
￿ g
￿ , play b in period 2 if not.” Suppose now that Column increases her strategy to “play g in
period 1, play b in period 2 regardless of the period-1 outcome.” Then, any best-response by
Row involves playing b in period 1—so no best response to the increase in Column’s strategy
involves an increase in Row’s strategy.
One SPNE outcome is
￿
5
￿ g
￿ g
￿
y
￿
t
￿ a
￿ a
￿
M
￿ —meaning that
￿ g
￿ g
￿ is the outcome the ﬁrst time the
game is played, and
￿ a
￿ a
￿ is the outcome the second time. Also,
￿
5
￿ b
￿ b
￿
t
￿
t
￿ b
￿ b
￿
￿
￿ is a SPNE
outcome. Now,
￿
5
￿ g
￿ g
￿
c
￿
t
￿ a
￿ a
￿
b
￿ and
￿
5
￿ b
￿ b
￿
|
￿
t
￿ b
￿ b
￿
M
￿ are unordered as vectors in
￿ a
￿ b
￿ g
￿
4, and
there are no larger SPNE outcomes—the vectors
￿
5
￿ g
￿ g
￿
t
￿
t
￿ b
￿ b
￿
b
￿ and
￿
5
￿ g
￿ g
￿
c
￿
M
￿ g
￿ g
￿
5
￿ are larger, but
they cannot be the result of a SPNE. So there is no largest SPNE outcome, which implies that
there is no largest SPNE, and that the set of SPNEs is not a lattice.
This example is important because it gets quickly hard to check that a game satisﬁes Deﬁ-
nition 4, so it would help if it were enough to check complementarities on per-period payoffs.
Then, even if Deﬁnition 4 is hard to satisfy, there is little hope that it can be weakened in a
fruitful way, as any such weakening should reasonably imply that the example above is a game
with strategic complementarities.
The negative conclusions about complementarities and SPNE contrast with existing results
on Markov-Perfect equilibria (Amir 1996a, Curtat 1996). Curtat’s (1996) results delivers one
monotone Markov-Perfect equilibrium for games with “per-period” complementarities. For
example, by using as state-space the strategy proﬁle chosen last period, one gets two constant
(and thus monotone) Markov-Perfect equilibria: i) play
￿ a
￿ a
￿ each period no matter what the
state and ii) play
￿ b
￿ b
￿ each period no matter what the state.
b) I shall discuss ﬁnitely- and inﬁnitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma. I assume that the
reader is familiar with a textbook analysis of the game at the level of, for example, Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991) or Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
20Consider ﬁnitely-repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Let us order the players’ actions such that
“cooperate” is larger than “defect” for each player—nothing depends on that order, we can
change it and get the same result. One-shot prisoner’s dilemma has strategic complementari-
ties because best-responses are constant (defect no matter what the opponent does), and thus
monotone increasing. One-shot prisoner’s dilemma also has a unique equilibrium, which gives
us a game with strategic complementarities in each step of the backward-induction process, as
the future consequences of any pair of chosen strategies are the same. Strategic complementar-
ities are thus inherited from one step to the next in the backward-induction process (see Amir
(1996b) for a discussion in the context of recursive decision problems).
Now consider inﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma with a large discount factor. For any
history h of play, there is a SPNE where both players cooperate after history h. Hence there
cannot be a largest SPNE, as the strategies “cooperate after any history” are not a SPNE. One
can thus not hope to obtain a result like Theorem 9 in this game. The root of the problem is
again that extended best-responses are not monotone increasing: if player 2 plays the strategy
“cooperate at any history where both have always cooperated, defect at any other history” it is a
best response for player 1 to play the strategy “cooperate at any history where both have always
cooperated, defect at any other history.” Now if player 2 increases her strategy to “cooperate
at all histories,” no best response by 1 will involve cooperating at the null history. Thus player
1’s best response does not increase.
Again, in this example per-period complementarities are sufﬁcient to get the existence of
a monotone Markov-Perfect equilibrium—but then some monotone Markov-Perfect equilibria
are trivial: use a singleton state-space and play “defect” for ever. The point is that per-period
complementarities are not enough to yield the results in Section 3.
3. The problem in the examples in item 2 is that complementarities are endogenous. I now
explain in more detail how this problem arises.
Suppose there are two players in a two-stage game. Each player i chooses, in time t, a real
21number ai
t, the players’ choices in each time period are simultaneous. Suppose that player i’s
payoff from outcome
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a2
2
￿ is ui
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a2
2
￿ , suppose that ui has the single-crossing
property for all possible pairs of its arguments. Note that, if choices were simultaneous,
this would be a game with strategic complementarities. Now lets look at the backward in-
duction solution to this game. From e.g. Milgrom and Shannon’s (1994) results, there is a
Nash equilibrium of each second-stage subgame that is monotone increasing in the ﬁrst-period
choices. That is, let
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿ be a Nash equilibrium in the
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ -subgame, and
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿ increase as
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ increases.
It is now easy to see that the induced ﬁrst-period game may not have complementarities.
Let a1
1
) a1
1, a2
1
) a2
1, and suppose that
ui
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
M
￿
I
# ui
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿
c
4
To obtain single-crossing in the induced ﬁrst-period payoffs, we need
ui
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿
I
# u1
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿
|
4
But the single-crossing assumptions on ui
1 only guarantee that
ui
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿
I
# u1
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿ a1
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
c
￿ a2
2
￿ a1
1
￿ a2
1
￿
5
￿
|
￿
and it is easy to generate examples where that is not enough for single crossing the ﬁrst-period
payoffs. 4
The problem is that existence of complementarities in period 1 depends on the period-two
equilibrium, so static complementarities assumptions are insufﬁcient to guarantee extensive-
form complementarities. Deﬁnition 4 puts enough structure on across-subgames complemen-
tarities so that the induced ﬁrst-period payoffs do have complementarities. It would be nice to
know if there are weaker conditions that guarantee this, but I think it is very unlikely that there
are any.
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R
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￿ y y
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L
" 0 2
R
" 3 2
r
R L
L
" 0 2
R
" 0 2
l
Figure 5: Payoffs to Player One in the game in Figure 2
4. Finally, I will show that the game in Example 1 is a game of strategic complementarities.
Order the actions so that L is larger than R, l is larger than r and L
" is larger that R
" . Consider
Figure 5. The two matrices to the right show the payoffs to player One for each of the eight
possible strategy proﬁles in this game.
Fix Two’s strategy s2
￿ r. We need to check that s1
Y
￿ u1
￿ s1
￿ r
￿ is quasisupermodular.
Here, u1
￿ RL
"
￿ r
￿
I
￿ 0
) u1
￿ RL
"
￿ LR
"
￿ r
￿
^
￿ u1
￿ RR
"
￿ r
￿
I
￿ 3, so the requirement in the deﬁnition
of quasisupermodularity is vacuous. Fix s2
￿ l, then u1
￿ RL
"
￿ LR
"
￿ l
￿
P
￿ u1
￿ RR
"
￿ l
￿
*
￿ 0 and
u1
￿ RL
"
￿ l
￿
f
￿ 0 so we need u1
￿ LR
"
￿ l
￿
V
# u1
￿ RL
"
￿ LR
"
￿ l
￿ . Which is satisﬁed since u1
￿ RL
"
￿
LR
"
￿ l
￿
x
￿ u1
￿ LL
"
￿ l
￿
x
￿ 2 and u1
￿ LR
"
￿ l
￿
x
￿ 2. Now, we need to check that the players’ payoffs
satisfy the single-crossing property. Note from Figure 5 that, when s2
￿ r, no increase in a
strategy by player One is proﬁtable. Since r
) l the single-crossing property in player One’s
payoffs is satisﬁed vacuously.
R L
L
" 0 0
R
" -1 0
s2
Figure 6: Gain from increasing Two’s strategy: u2
￿ s1
￿ l
￿
_
i u2
￿ s1
￿ r
￿ .
To see that Two’s payoffs satisfy the single-crossing property, consider Figure 6. The
ﬁgure shows the gain to Two u2
￿ s1
￿ l
￿
￿
i u2
￿ s1
￿ r
￿ from increasing his strategy from r to l.
It is seen directly from the ﬁgure that whenever u2
￿ s1
￿ l
￿
￿
i u2
￿ s1
￿ r
￿
’
￿ 0 and s1
) s1
" then
23u2
￿ s1
"
U
￿ l
￿
￿
i u2
￿ s1
"
U
￿ r
￿
$
￿ 0. This establishes that the game in Figure 2 is a game of strategic
complementarities.
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26Notes
1They are not dominance-solvable, as might be suggested by the discussion above.
2See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for the two usual
deﬁnitions.
3 Optional BoS II shows that the property of having complementarities is not robust to
the addition of an irrelevant move. This is also true about complementarities in normal-form
games, so this non-robustness does not cause complementarities to be especially restrictive in
extensive-form games.
4For example, ui
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1a2
1a1
2a2
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1
￿ 1
i a1
1
￿
￿ a1
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￿ 1
i a1
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￿ works if we restrict
ai
t
￿ 0.